Enamullah T.

Vehicles in Australia showed incorrect DPF brick orientation, weld leakage, and weld spatter on part 68323796AA from supplier Purem North America, with multiple vehicles already in the buyback process.

The defect had already escaped to customers, manufacturing documentation initially looked compliant, and root cause wasn't visible without a deeper audit — all under active buyback urgency with exposure beyond Australia.

Led the investigation end to end — contained suspect inventory, audited the supplier's manufacturing and sub-supplier processes, ran structured 5-Why/Ishikawa root cause analysis, and uncovered that the canning process had been outsourced to a sub-supplier without equivalent quality controls, bypassing the poka-yoke system.

Contained the defect globally, restored certified shipments, and drove permanent corrective action — reinstating the vision-based poka-yoke and resubmitting PPAP — closing the issue without further quality escapes.

Supplier bankruptcy required an immediate production transfer of the Power Brake Booster Assembly across Jeep Rubicon and RAM Truck (MY2020–2024), with minimal room for supplier development.

Mid-review I found the Engineering BOM didn't reflect the approved production configuration, and the supplier's IMDS submission was incomplete — either gap could have stalled final PPAP approval.

Owned the full APQP/PPAP qualification, escalated the BOM discrepancy to Engineering for correction, drove IMDS compliance to closure, approved an Interim PPAP to protect production, then closed Final PPAP six days later.

Zero production shutdown, zero launch delay, full PPAP approval, and a newly qualified supplier with validated manufacturing readiness.

Engineering released part 8AA39 (XZ4 adjustable liftgate) and cancelled legacy part 5RJ07 (JRC power liftgate) for MY27+, but the change notice misclassified it as "no replacement," and the new press-and-hold switch wasn't functionally interchangeable with the legacy press action.

The supplier couldn't reliably manufacture both switch configurations at once, while Mopar still had to support existing and future vehicles simultaneously — a standard supersession would have compromised one side.

Redesigned the Service BOM around a modular strategy: decoupled the switch into an independently serviceable component, established model-year-based applicability, escalated the change-notice misclassification, and coordinated the strategy across engineering, supplier manufacturing, Mopar, and catalog teams.

Achieved 100% service readiness across MY26–MY28 configurations, cut service turnaround time by ~30%, and reduced dealer ordering errors by an estimated 25–35%.

The dealer's terminology grouped two unrelated transmission-area components under one generic description, creating real risk of a wrong-part shipment.

The ambiguity lived in terminology, not in engineering data — resolving it required functional analysis, not a catalog lookup.

Compared EBOM against SBOM and catalog exploded-view callouts, mapping each part by function: callout 8 (04670707AA) as the everyday gearshift control cable, callout 7 (68066474AE) as the emergency park/neutral release mechanism used only for towing. Built a short diagnostic step for the dealer to confirm the actual failure mode first.

Avoided a wrong-part shipment, cut the technical clarification cycle by roughly 40%, and strengthened SBOM-to-catalog traceability for similar future cases.

The new facility showed strong manufacturing capability, but formal IATF 16949 certification was still in progress at the time production approval was needed.

Delaying approval until certification completed risked supply continuity; approving without conditions risked quality governance — a binary decision would have compromised one or the other.

Led the supplier eligibility audit across quality management systems, process capability, traceability, and change management, then built a risk-based phased approval: a formal IATF commitment letter from supplier leadership, conditional production while certification continued, and scheduled follow-up verification.

The transfer proceeded without disrupting North American supply, quality governance stayed intact, and certification risk was actively managed rather than ignored.